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In 1970 only one percent of American housing units were located in a homeowner association, condominium or
cooperative – the three main instruments of collective private ownership of housing.  By 1998, this figure had
risen to 15 percent.  In major metropolitan areas, 50 percent of new housing units is being built and sold as part
of a collective ownership regime.  The rapid spread of collective private ownership of American housing is
creating a social revolution in local governance.  Private organizations are becoming responsible for collecting
garbage, providing security, maintaining common recreation areas and many other collective tasks within the
neighborhood area of common property ownership.  The private enforcement of covenants takes the place of
municipal zoning in regulating the quality of the immediate exterior environment.  Private neighborhoods
operate under different “constitutional” ground rules than traditional local governments in the public sector.
The allocation of voting rights in private associations, for example, is based on property ownership rather than
numbers of adult residents.  The greater flexibility in governing arrangements of private neighborhoods has
many advantages.  The paper concludes by suggesting that collective private property rights should be made
available to many existing neighborhoods in place of their current zoning controls.  It would amount to the
“privatization” of zoning.
Key words: Housing, Local Governance, Collective Action, Community Associations, Privatization
JEL Numbers:  D7, H4, H7, R14, R31
                                                
* This paper is adapted from a forthcoming book, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Social Revolution in
America.   Additional copies of the paper can be obtained at www.icer.it .
†  Address: School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742 USA.
Email: rn29@umail.umd.edu .1
             A social revolution is taking place today in the arrangements by which Americans
own and manage their housing. The housing model for most of American history was a
single unit owned or rented by an individual person or family.  If there was a need for
collective action among individual home owners, it was met by government.  Local
governments provided services such as the construction and upkeep of streets, collecting the
garbage, maintenance of law and order and many others.  Following the introduction of
zoning in the United States in 1916, they also regulated interactions among individual
properties that could significantly affect the quality of the exterior environment.
             Since the 1960s, however, this historic role of local government has increasingly
been replaced by the exercise of collective private property rights.  At present 15 percent of
all Americans are living in a homeowners association, condominium or cooperative, up
from one percent in 1970. It is likely that 25 percent of Americans will be living under an
arrangement of collective private property rights by 2020.
1  In terms of absolute numbers,
collective private ownerships have grown from fewer than 500 community associations in
the United States as recently as 1962 to more than 200,000 today.  This includes more than
42 million Americans.
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             In the State of California – always a bellweather for the rest of the nation -- more
than 40 percent of existing housing units by the late 1980s were included in a common
ownership regime.
3   Across the 50 largest metropolitan areas in the United States today,
more than 50 percent of new housing is being built under arrangements for collective
property ownership.  As law professor Robert Natelson has observed,  the several forms of
collective private ownership of residential property have "emerged from the legal periphery
to become a central feature of modern society."
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              The operating rules and management of these collective private ownerships differ in
significant ways from conventional local governments in the public sector.  The assignment
of voting rights, for example, is based in most private communities on the extent of
ownership of property and excludes renters from a vote. The residents of some private
communities are limited to senior citizens, a form of social discrimination that would be
impermissible for a local town government.  Although it is an area of continuing legal
scholarship and evolution of court opinions, private actions typically are regarded in the law
in a much different category than governmental acts.
             As a result, the transformation of local collective actions from a governmental to a
private property status has the potential for significantly altering the basic character of local
collective action in the United States.  The far reaching consequences, two researchers in the
housing field declared, have amounted to a "quiet revolution in the structure of community
organization, local government, land-use control, and neighbor relations."
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Neighborhood Associations
The two most important legal instruments for collective private ownership of
residential property are the homeowners association and the condominium.  In a
homeowners association, each person owns his or her home individually, often including a
private yard.  The homeowners association -- which any new entrant into the common
neighborhood area is required to join -- is a separate legal entity that holds the streets, parks,
recreation facilities, and other "common areas" of the neighborhood.  It also enforces the
neighborhood covenants with respect to the allowable uses and modifications of the
individually owned homes and other buildings.   The individual owners of neighborhood3
homes are the “shareholders” who collectively control the activities of the homeowners
association.
The other main instrument of collective private ownership is the condominium.  In a
condominium, all the individual owners both have title to their own personal units and, as
"tenants in common," automatically share a percentage interest in the "common elements."
These common elements can include things like dividing walls, stairways, hallways, roofs,
yards, green spaces, and other parts of the project exterior to the individually occupied
units.
6  As of 1990, 42 percent of neighborhood associations were under condominium
ownership and 51 percent were homeowners associations.  Despite the somewhat different
legal frameworks, the operating rules and forms of management of homeowners
associations and condominiums are generally quite similar.
Most of the remaining collective ownerships in the United States are cooperatives.
More likely to be a single building, cooperatives became popular in New York City in the
decades after World War II -- one device for avoiding problems that rent control was posing
for owners of apartment buildings.  A cooperative is the truest form of collective ownership
in that the entire property, including the individual housing units, are owned collectively.
Individual occupants of apartments have legal entitlements to the use of their units but are
not, strictly speaking, the legal owners even of the interior portions.  Cooperatives typically
exercise the tightest controls over new entrants, often screening proposed buyers for
professional background, age and other personal characteristics, financial viability, and other
specific concerns of the cooperative members.
The homeowners’ association and the cooperative have a long if modest place until
recently in the history of housing in the United States.  The legal foundations for4
condominium ownership were set in place only in the 1960s.   In describing these several
forms of ownership, different commentators have grouped them together under terms such
as "residential community association," "common interest community," "residential private
government," "gated community" and others.   In this paper I will refer to all such
arrangements for collective private ownership of residential property as a "neighborhood
association" -- recognizing that in practice collective ownerships may be as small as a single
building or as large as a full-sized city.  The average collective private ownership, however,
is of neighborhood size, containing about 200 housing units.
Privatizing the Neighborhood
Neighborhood associations typically have the right to control most structural
alterations that could affect the exterior quality of the neighborhood environment.  One
function of the neighborhood association might be described as a private form of zoning --
the exclusion of unwanted uses from the neighborhood. One of the most important tasks of
neighborhood associations is to maintain restrictions on the use of property that are designed
to maintain the character of the neighborhood, as it attracted residents in the first place.
Much like zoning, as law professor James Winokur comments, "concern for segregation of
land uses," providing protection from "industrial, commercial and even multi-family
residential uses," is a leading motive in private land use agreements.
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Yet, most neighborhood associations go well beyond conventional municipal
zoning, operating more in the manner of an historic district.  Thus, in the typical
neighborhood association the residents collectively can control the color of house paint, the
location of fences and shrubbery, the parking of vehicles in driveways, the placement of
television antennas and receivers, the design of new decks, and in fact virtually any exterior5
features of the physical structures of the neighborhood. Some associations require, for
example, that garage doors must be kept closed when not in use.  In the typical
neighborhood association, these matters are controlled by the  "conditions, covenants and
restrictions" (CC&Rs) to which each resident must agree.
Collective control may extend into various realms of social behavior such as the
playing of loud music or the holding of late-night parties. One Florida neighborhood
association banned the use of alcoholic beverages in the neighborhood clubhouse and
nearby areas. Many associations have restrictions on the ownership of pets, sometimes
based on their size and weight.  Other aspects of behavior that have been restricted by
neighborhood associations include: the use of patio furniture and barbeques, the frequency
of toilet flushing, and the type of soap used in dishwashers.
Part of the terms of ownership may be mandatory membership in a recreational unit
such as a golf course or tennis facility. Some neighborhood associations also impose
restrictions on the transferability of housing units.  They may prohibit leasing of a unit to
another party; another provision found in some association documents is a neighborhood
right-of-first refusal on the sale of an individual unit.
Although regulation of such matters can obviously be intrusive, the rapidly growing
numbers of people choosing to live in a neighborhood association shows that many people
are willing to sacrifice elements of their personal autonomy for the resulting greater control
over the actions of their neighbors.  As one person observed, "your neighbor will probably
be prevented from rebuilding his '57 Chevy in his front yard, or parking his recreational
vehicle for six months at a time."  A Southern California professional woman commented
that "I thought I'd never live in a planned unit development but then I realized I wanted a6
single-family detached home with some control over my neighbors.  I looked at one house
without a homeowner association.  The guy next door built a dog run on the property line.
All night long his Dobermans ran back and forth."
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Neighborhood associations for senior citizens are common in many parts of the
United States; in these associations at least one resident of each housing unit must typically
be 55 years or older.  Racial discrimination would clearly be illegal privately or publicly but
the legal acceptability of other forms of discrimination – whether, for example, it would be
possible to create a neighborhood association limited to unmarried adults or to gay people –
remains to be determined by courts and legislatures.  Church groups now often sponsor
private camps and other summer retreats that are limited to believers in the common faith.
Perhaps it would be possible to form private neighborhoods for full time residency on a
similar model – ranging from neighborhoods of orthodox Jews to Southern Baptists.
  The very fact of the high purchase price of housing units in  many neighborhood
associations inevitably results in consideration discrimination among residents by level of
income – a feature that led the former Secretary of Labor, Robert Reich, to criticize private
neighborhood associations as the “secession of the successful” from the lives of their less
fortunate fellow citizens.
9  Neighborhood associations in this respect, to be sure, largely
replicate the longstanding discriminatory impact of municipal zoning exclusions. Both
replicate the distributional  impact of a system of private property rights.  The rich not only
live in much better neighborhoods but also eat in fancy  French restaurants and drive
Mercedes Benzes; the poor eat in McDonalds and drive 10-year old used Fords.  This is one
of a number of respects in which it is apt to speak of the historical evolution of municipal
zoning practice in the United States as the “privatization of zoning.”
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Most neighborhood associations provide at least some forms of public services.  The
most common include garbage collection, lawn mowing, street maintenance, snow removal,
landscaping, and management of common recreation facilities.
* An important function of
many neighborhood associations is to protect the personal security of residents through
internal patrols, maintaining control over entry points, and other private policing methods.
“Gated communities” with restricted entry are estimated to be about 10 percent of all
neighborhood associations – a  figure that may well rise in the future.
11  Neighborhood
associations may also provide services such as bus transportation, child care, nursery
schools, health clinics and a community newsletter. The privatization of government
functions was a worldwide trend in the 1980s and 1990s but affected the United States less
at the federal level.  Indeed, over the past quarter century the rise of the private
neighborhood association has been the leading form of privatization at any level of
government in the United States.
Neighborhood associations pay for their administration and delivery of services by
levying assessments on members.  There is wide variation but a typical assessment falls in
the range of $100 to $300 per month per housing unit.   It amounts to a private form of
taxation. Total collections of assessments nationwide by neighborhood associations are on
the order of $25 billion per year.  The levels of assessments and other aspects of the
management of neighborhood associations are typically determined by elected boards of
directors. There may be various subcommittees such as the architectural review committee
that typically oversees enforcement of the neighborhood land use restrictions.
                                                
* .  Nationally, 69 percent of neighborhood associations provide swimming pools, 46 percent
clubhouses or community rooms, 41 percent tennis courts, 28 percent playgrounds, 20
percent parks or natural areas, 17 percent exercise facilities, 16 percent lakes, 4 percent golf8
In the normal arrangement, a single vote in a neighborhood association election is
assigned to each housing unit, or votes are allocated in proportion to square feet or some
other measure of value.  Multiple occupants of a single housing unit thus must all share one
vote and renters do not have a vote at all.   The one-man-one-vote requirement applied by
the Supreme Court to local municipal governments does not apply to private neighborhood
associations.
The departure from normal democratic practice takes an extreme form in the
transitional phase when a private neighborhood is still being developed.  In order to protect
their investment in the neighborhood, developers normally retain voting control until the
construction of the new neighborhood is nearing completion.  In a typical arrangement, the
developer might retain a majority of  the voting shares until the project is 75 percent
complete. Thus, the early residents are effectively disenfranchised for a period that may
extend for a year or more.  By contrast, in a public setting a new adult resident receives full
voting rights as soon as he or she moves into a municipality.
Indeed, in a public setting this has caused major economic and social problems in
transitional areas where new residents may soon outnumber the older residents, even though
it is the older residents who own most of the land and other private property.  The new
residents may rezone the remaining farms and other vacant land in a developing community
to suit their own preferences for low densities or even for open space.  The development
rights of the vacant land owners are thus effectively confiscated through a municipal zoning
action.  The social problems of “exclusionary zoning” are closely associated with the
workings of such political dynamics in municipal voting on the suburban fringe.
12
                                                                                                                                                
courses, 4 percent marinas, and 4 percent restaurants.
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The board of directors of a neighborhood association often contracts with a private
management firm to administer the affairs of the neighborhood association. Thus, instead of
electing a mayor or other one top official to administer the neighborhood functions, the
neighborhood picks a private business manager.  This person may have no other connection
with the neighborhood.  Instead of an election, the process of selection more closely
resembles competitive bidding – economics here replaces politics.  The act of choosing a
new private firm to manage the neighborhood association is tantamount to dismissing the
entire civil service of a municipal government.
In the commercial retail field, the rise of the shopping center as an important feature
in American land use has occurred in about the same timeframe as the emergence of
neighborhood associations.  Yet, few shopping centers are collectively owned; instead, the
individual stores rent their properties from a single owner of the whole shopping center.  In
concept, residential neighborhoods could operate in a similar fashion.  Each occupant of a
residential unit might rent his or her unit from a single business owner of the whole
neighborhood.   Rental agreements could even be as long as 20 or 30 years.  In that case, not
only the day-to-day administration but all the basic decision making for the neighborhood
would be undertaken as a commercial decision by the owner.   Collective choice for the
neighborhood residents through any form of political process – public or private -- would be
abolished altogether.
Yet, most new purchasers of housing have rejected this option.  In buying their
homes they have opted for common ownership regimes that allow them to maintain the
collective control of the neighborhood in their own hands.  Rather than tenants of a business
owner, they prefer to run their own affairs through a democratic political process, if now10
taking place in a newly private setting.  It is like a  business corporation but the owners of
the neighborhood “stock” are the residents of the neighborhood themselves.
The legal terms and operating rules of neighborhood associations are first
established before residents move in.  After-the-fact creation of a neighborhood association
among existing individual owners of housing is usually precluded by the high transactions
costs that would be involved.  In brand new developments, however, the initial buyers and
any subsequent purchasers are required as a condition of their purchase to agree to the
common rules of the neighborhood association – to agree to abide by a “private
constitution” for the neighborhood, as one might call the founding set of neighborhood
association documents.  Although John Locke once famously conceived of government as a
voluntary compact formed among people previously living in a state of nature, the private
neighborhood association is one of the few instances in the real world where any such
original contract has ever literally been signed by all the parties.
Various provisions are often included in the rules of neighborhood associations for
later amendment in the governing procedures, analogous in some ways to amending the
constitution of a sovereign state.  Although unanimous agreement might be an ideal, in
practice there are bound to be obstinate dissenters and holdouts, some of whom may be
pursuing complex bargaining strategies. Thus, a supermajority vote of the unit owners is
required in most neighborhood associations for important changes in neighborhood rules.  A
simple majority may be enough for smaller changes.   Neighborhood associations are new
enough that the procedures for changing their basic operating rules have not yet been tested
very thoroughly or  extensively.11
Few neighborhood associations have had to address some important transitional
issues such as a change in economic circumstance that makes the entire neighborhood much
more valuable in a brand new form of land use.  The construction of a new subway stop, for
example, could double or triple land values in the vicinity.  In that case the residents might
want to adopt a new constitutional set of agreements for the neighborhood that is better
suited to the new land uses that are likely to enter.  In concept at least, the private status of
the neighborhood association could also permit the members to vote to dissolve their
neighborhood association altogether, and for everyone to move away, taking their large
profits with them.  If a neighborhood were to vote to abolish itself, there would be an issue
of the proper voting procedure, exactly how the property in the neighborhood would be sold
(house by house, for example, or the whole neighborhood at a time), and how the profits
would be divided up (in proportion to square feet, to individualized assessments, or other
options).
A New Field of Constitutional Study
The social sciences are often slow to adapt to the real world.  The fundamental
importance of the corporate form of collective ownership of business property was not
acknowledged by many academic economists until long after it had become a central feature
of American industry.  Indeed, it was not until 1932 that Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in
a much celebrated work captured the full attention of the economics profession, announcing
that the rise of the private corporation had transformed the basic relationship in the United
States between the ownership of business property and the managerial control over the
instruments of production.
13  Even today, much of formal economic analysis is still
conducted in a market framework of atomistic firms with individual owners and decision12
makers.   The analysis of an industry consisting of a small number of large oligopolistic
business firms who make management decisions through a complex political process
involving stockholders and top executives is ill-suited to most economic methods.
In the ownership of residential property as well, social scientists have been slow to
recognize some fundamental changes in American society.  They have shown little
awareness of the importance of the rise of collective instruments of private residential
ownership.  To be sure, there is now a considerable body of literature in the law journals that
describes the new legal frameworks for collective private ownership of housing and raises
issues with respect to possible legal changes and the potential consequences. In 1988 the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations sought to draw attention to the
fundamental implications for future structures of American governance, declaring that the
changing patterns of ownership of residential property amounted to "the most significant
privatization of local government responsibilities in recent times."
14  Yet, in political science
it was not until the 1990s that a small body of literature began to address the rise of the
neighborhood association – often finding much to criticize in this development. Among
economists the literature today is limited to a few professional articles.
The rise of the neighborhood association can be seen as a fundamental rewriting of
the constitutional groundrules for local government in the United States.  It is a political
experiment today taking place on a grand scale with changed voting rules, altered regulatory
regimes, new means of providing local public services and many other institutional
innovations.  Because of the flexibility afforded by the private status, there is a much wider
range of possibilities in local constitutional design than would be available to a
governmental entity.  Neighborhoods are in concept able to write their constitutions to suit13
their particular governmental preferences.  A “libertarian” neighborhood, for example,
might be one where the constitutional groundrules limit collective controls and the decisions
of the local political process to a bare minimum.  Other private neighborhoods would be free
to experiment with other concepts of collective control and the manner of collective
governance.  If the 50 American states have been described as the “laboratories of
democracy,” the potential range of democratic experiment is even much larger still for the
many thousands of local constitutions for private neighborhoods in the United States.  It is a
broad new field of constitutional study.
Early Homeowners Associations
The modern era of collective private ownership of residential property began in
London.  By the eighteenth century private parks in London sometimes included covenants
among the neighboring lot owners, who jointly pledged to support future upkeep and
maintenance of the park.   These models inspired the first common ownership regime in the
United States in Gramercy Park in New York City in 1831.
15  A land developer, Samuel
Ruggles, had set aside and fenced in this area for the mutual private enjoyment of the 66
neighboring lot owners. He deeded over Gramercy Park to these owners and named them as
the  collective trustees.
The first true homeowners association was established to provide for the upkeep of
Louisberg Square in Boston.  A central common area there had been included when the
project was built in 1826 but no special provision had been made for its maintenance.  In
1844, the 28 nearby lot owners resolved this problem by signing a mutual agreement to
establish the Committee of the Proprietors of Louisberg Square, binding themselves and
their successors to keep up the park.  This was one of the rare instances in which a14
neighborhood association has been formed after-the-fact of separate ownership of individual
homes or other properties.
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, housing developers in the United States
began building large private communities in greater numbers.  In order to protect the
character of the community environment, the developers included extensive private
covenants attached to the deeds of the initial purchasers, also binding any subsequent
owners. However, enforcement of these covenants in many cases depended on some
individual willing to shoulder the burden of legal action on his own.  It was a typical free
rider situation where the collective benefit might be large but the cost to the individual might
exceed the individual benefit.  As a result, as urban historian David Beito comments,
"covenants generally suffered from the lack of an effective enforcement mechanism."
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In order to deal with this problem, developers devised the idea of forming a
mandatory private association. .  In 1914 a leading early American community builder,
James Nichols, established the first such association at the Mission Hills development near
Kansas City, Missouri.  Besides enforcing the covenants, a mandatory association could also
provide certain other common services.  The Radburn new town in New Jersey, designed in
the 1920s by progressive reformers seeking to demonstrate the advantages of
comprehensive social and physical planning, included an association whose responsibilities,
among others, was to enforce an extensive set of covenants.
The spreading use of covenants and homeowner associations was almost coincident
with the rapid adoption of municipal zoning, following its American introduction in New
York City in 1916.  Both new property right institutions met much the same needs.
However, they were initially put in place in neighborhoods in much different ways.  A basic15
distinction was that zoning was normally established by government fiat and in an after-the-
fact manner in many existing neighborhoods.  A homeowners association was established
by the actions of a developer before the first residents arrived in a new area, and each
resident had to agree in advance to accept the neighborhood covenants and other
groundrules as a condition of purchase.
One less savory consideration leading some new neighborhoods to rely on private
devices was that racially exclusive covenants were legal until 1948.  Racial zoning had been
declared unconstitutional much earlier in 1917.  A policy of racial segregation, maintained
by restrictions included in private covenants, was a common feature for large private
housing projects in both the north and south in the period between World War I and World
War II.
Following World War II, individual home ownership shot upward in the United
States.  The Urban Land Institute (which had been formed in 1936) and other builder
organizations promoted the mechanism of the mandatory homeowner association as a
practical way of taking care of green spaces, playgrounds, swimming pools, tennis courts
and other common property areas increasingly being included in large developments.
During the post-war building boom, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) actively
encouraged builders to make comprehensive use of deed restrictions and demanded that they
be tightly enforced -- in part to ensure that FHA would not be called upon to bail out failing
developments. FHA provided technical assistance to developers in both designing the
physical layout of large projects and establishing a suitable set of neighborhood covenants to
protect the neighborhood character.  Following the creation of a mortgage guarantee
program in the Veterans Administration in 1944, this agency followed similar policies.16
Nevertheless, as noted above, it is estimated that fewer than full fledged 500 neighborhood
associations existed in the United States in 1962.
It was in the 1960s that the key foundations for the explosive growth of
neighborhood associations over the next several decades would be laid.  Like most
developments in land law, it was not a matter of practice following urban planning theory or
any other intellectual constructs.  Rather, the key roles were played by practitioners in the
real estate industry and career officials in the housing agencies of the federal government.
They were simply responding to perceived home builder needs that could be met by
improving the legal instruments for ownership of residential property.  In 1963, for example,
FHA issued technical assistance for homeowners associations in a key document on
Planned-Unit Development with a Homes Association.  Working collaboratively with FHA,
the Urban Land Institute in 1964 published the The Homes Association Handbook, destined




The major legal innovation of the 1960s was the development in the United States of
the condominium form of ownership.  Although homeowners associations dated back to the
nineteenth century, the first condominiums in the United States were in Puerto Rico where a
rudimentary condominium law had been enacted in 1951.  Puerto Rican developers were
influenced by the example of other builders throughout Latin America.  Condominium
ownership had spread rapidly there, following its introduction in Brazil in 1928.  Tracing
matters back further, France had a "horizontal property" law as early as 1804.  The earliest
known antecedents of condominium ownership are found in the Middle Ages in Germany17
where "story property" -- the separate ownership of different stories within the same
structure – is known to have existed as long ago as the 1100s.
18
 In 1960, however, the condominium concept was still virtually unknown in the
continental United States.  At the request of Puerto Rican representatives, hearings were
held in by the House Subcommittee on Housing of the Committee on Banking and
Currency, and by a Senate Committee.  Following these hearings, Congress provided in
Section 234 of the National Housing Act of 1961 for the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) to make its mortgage insurance available to condominium units.  FHA promptly took
steps to promote the new ownership instrument, including the publication of a model state
condominium statute.
19  By 1967, in most cases based on the FHA model, almost every state
had adopted some kind of legislation setting a legal framework for condominium ownership.
All these efforts served to generate wide attention within the building industry to the
advantages of condominium ownership as a tool of large project development.
By the 1960s and 1970s there were new pressures for greater housing densities,
including the still rising demands for home ownership of baby boom families, slowing of
highway construction, tighter suburban limits on land use availability, and greater demands
in general to limit growth for environmental reasons.  Such factors contributed to a new
tightness in metropolitan land supplies and rapid escalations in some metropolitan areas of
the price of land.  Collective ownership allowed for the realization of land economies of
scale through higher densities -- including collective provision of parks, green spaces and
other common areas -- without having to sacrifice the advantages of ownership of the
individually occupied housing units.  As Marc Weiss and John Watts observe, neighborhood
associations "continued to enforce deed restrictions but their essential purposes increasingly18
reflected other priorities: the provision of attractive services and the economical
maintenance of common property."
20  As Robert Natelson has explained:
Through its preservation and community enhancement activities the
association offers its members the ... replacement of high contract costs with
lower agency costs.... Without an association, the members would have to
investivate each of the large number of amenities and services available in
modern society, learn enough about each amenity and service to be able to
understand its pricing, appraise different services provided by the same
supplier (as when a single maintenance person both mows lawns and repairs
plumbing), and assess the respective contributions of each participant in a
single project.  By purchasing a unit in a subdivision governed by a Property
Owners Association, the owner receives the entire panoply of services in
exchange for one periodic monthly assessment.
21
In 1970 there were about 10,000 neighborhood associations – still only about 1
percent of U.S. housing units but a sharp increase in absolute number from ten years earlier.
At that point, 12 percent of all neighborhood associations were in the condominium form of
collective ownership. By 1990, this figure would rise to 42 percent as condominiums
increasingly became a familiar feature of the American urban and suburban scene.
Growing Pains
Already by the late 1960s, to be sure, criticisms began to appear that condominiums
and other neighborhood associations were exhibiting growing pains.  The transition from
developer to resident control was often proving troublesome.  Many developers, having little
familiarity with this new form of ownership, paid insufficient attention to the details of
association management.  Associations often exhibited difficulties in holding required
meetings, keeping adequate records, and enforcing effectively the covenants and other rules.
In 1973, a survey of 1,760 condominium residents found that most were satisfied with their
overall condominium experience but 61 percent were dissatisfied with aspects of the
specific workings of the association management.19
In that same year, leaders in the real estate industry joined together to form the
Community Association Institute (CAI).  Its purpose was to promote the role of collective
ownership of residential property and to provide education in methods of establishing and
managing neighborhood associations.  The CAI over the years has provided models for
various aspects of association governance such as procedures for the shifting of control from
the developer to the residents as a project nears completion.  CAI provides today a wide
range of training programs in the management of neighborhood associations.
Another important step was the approval in the mid 1970s by the Federal National
Mortgage Association (FNMA) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(FHLMC) of inclusion of condominium and planned unit development loans in the bundling
of mortgages in the secondary market.  With these and other steps, purchasers of housing
units in neighborhood associations now received the same forms of government support that
had long been directed to individual home owners.
In the late 1970s the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
organized the development of a new set of model laws for collective ownership of private
property.  With the support also of the American Bar Association, the Commissioners
published a model law for condominiums in 1980 and for planned communities in 1981.
These model laws offered further guidance to improve the day-to-day functioning of
neighborhood associations.  For example, full prior disclosure to the purchaser of the details
of association land use restrictions and of the size of mandatory assessments was required.
Enforcement procedures to ensure compliance of residents with association rules, and
prompt payment of assessments, were tightened and improved.  The model law20
recommended that a 67 percent vote be required to amend the basic working rules for the
neighborhood association.
In California, the Davis-Stirling Act in the 1980s set a number of requirements for
the management of neighborhood associations.
22 It requires that board meetings be open to
residents of the association; budgets must be prepared annually with appropriate financial
disclosures; procedures are laid out for use of fines as a means of enforcing payment of
assessments; and associations are required to make minutes of meetings available to
residents.  The California legislation generally seeks to ensure that a fair and reasonable set
of procedural standards are met in the management of neighborhood associations.
The housing role of neighborhood associations was advanced by the fiscal crisis of
many local governments in the 1970s and 1980s.  New financial pressures meant that these
governments were less willing to accept added responsibilities for building and maintaining
streets, collecting garbage and providing other municipal services.  For example, the passage
in 1978 of Proposition 13 in California, limiting the ability of local governments to raise
property taxes, provided a boost to the use of neighborhood associations in that state.   In
other states as well, providing services privately through a neighborhood association, and
thus relieving part of the fiscal burden of development on a municipality, has often been a
condition of approval for large new developments.
23
In 1988 the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) stated
that "traditionally the intergovernmental system has been thought to include the national
government, state governments, and local governments of all kinds."  Such thinking now
had to be modified, however, to recognize that "the concept of intergovernmental relations
should be adapted to contemporary developments so as to take account of territorial21
community associations that display many, if not all, of the characteristics of traditional
local government."  Given the very rapid growth of such associations, by which "private
organizations substitute for local government service provision," it would be necessary to
devote greater research in the future to this important new instrument of local governance
and  innovation in the forms of American private property ownership.
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Thus, since the mid 1960s, private neighborhoods have become a routine part of
land development over much of the United States.
25  By the 1990s, students of
neighborhood associations would find that their widespread use was "transforming the urban
and suburban landscape, not just physically but also politically."
26  It was the most important
form of privatization taking place in the United States in the context of powerful worldwide
trends to abolish the legacies of socialist schemes for scientific management and to turn
instead to the private sector to meet many basic social needs.
Neighborhood Associations Today
In 1998 the total number of housing units in neighborhood associations reached 16.4
million.  California and Florida have the largest numbers of neighborhood associations.  The
number of condominiums increased by 101 percent in California and 85 percent in Florida
from 1980 to 1990.  Other states where they are common include New York, New Jersey,
Illinois, and Texas.  In the suburbs of Washington, D.C., about about a third of the residents
in affluent Montgomery County now live in a neighborhood association.
27  According to a
survey conducted by the Community Associations Institute, more than 60 percent of all
neighborhood associations nationwide are located in suburban areas
The largest single category of housing in neighborhood associations is townhouses.
Single family homes in 1990 represented 18 percent of the units.  The majority of homes in22
neighborhood associations belong to associations that extend beyond individual buildings to
include territorial responsibilities of some sort.  The typical operating budget of a
neighborhood association is $100,000 to $200,000 per year, although 5 percent of those
associations belonging to the Community Association Institute (about 10,000) had budgets
greater than $1.5 million per year.  In order to cover the costs of neighborhood services and
other activities, the neighborhood association levies an assessment on each member.  The
typical fee -- which is mandatory for anyone living in the neighborhood -- is about $100 to
$200 per month.  A member of the neighborhood association who fails to pay the
assessment is subject to fines, a lien on their property, or other enforcement actions.
The management of neighborhoods has engaged the active efforts of hundreds of
thousands of people; an estimated 750,000 people nationwide and 100,000 in California
alone serve on the boards of directors of private neighborhood associations.  The average
board member is 48 years old, has served on the board for 2.9 years, and spends 9 hours per
month on board activities.  The leading reason given by board members for their willingness
to serve is to “protect property value.”  The second leading reason is a sense of
neighborhood “civic duty.”  Forty-two percent of boards delegate the basic management
task for the neighborhood association to an outside management company.
Housing units in homeowners’ associations have the highest average value,
$118,000 per unit, followed by condominiums at $100,300 per unit.  An estimated 64
percent of all homes in neighborhood associations of any type are part of a homeowners’
association.  The total value of residential property in neighborhood associations in the
United States is $1.8 trillion.23
From Zoning to Private Rights
Four overarching themes characterize this social revolution in American property
rights that is rapidly bringing about the privatization of the American neighborhood.   First,
the privatization of collective controls over the uses of residential property began much
earlier in the twentieth century under zoning.  Whatever the official rationales, the actual
practice of zoning -- following its first American adoption in New York City in 1916 --
anticipated the later formal development and spread of collective private ownership of
residential property.  Zoning provided a new power to exclude unwanted land uses; in this
respect, it amounted to a new de facto collective property right to the neighborhood exterior
environment.
History shows that new property rights seldom emerge from whole cloth.  The
normal course of events is a period of gradual evolution, perhaps followed by a
formalization in the law decades (or even centuries) later.  The rise of collective private
ownership of American residential property took such a course, beginning early in the
twentieth century with the establishment of neighborhood zoning controls and only later
adopting an explicitly private framework of collective property rights in the law.
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Second, the new collective forms of ownership of residential private property are a
matter of fundamental importance to American society not only in terms of the history of
property rights but also of public finance, city planning, public service provision and  other
traditional functions of local government.  Neighborhood associations are forms of private
governance,  if usually encompassing a geographic area smaller than the typical
municipality. Yet, as described above, neighborhood associations operate under
constitutional groundrules that differ in many ways from municipal governments.24
Neighborhood associations have a much greater flexibility in institutional design – they are
free to engage in much wider local constitutional experiments -- owing to their private
status.  In principle, they can be more discriminatory about whom they admit, regulate
virtually any aspect of neighborhood land use, impose various forms of “private taxes,”
build gates around their boundaries, sell off the whole neighborhood collectively, close off
streets to public use, and take other actions that would often be difficult or impossible for a
municipal government.  Based on the revealed preferences of millions of Americans in
actual housing decisions, many of these Americans in fact desire the constitutional
framework for local private government that neighborhood associations are able to provide.
Third, neighborhood associations not only offer a new constitutional flexibility to
devise innovative mechanisms of local governance but they create the opportunity as well to
promote a strong sense of community that is often missing today in American life.  In a
mobile society where relations among its members are often impersonal, there is a need for
new social institutions that facilitate the coming together of Americans in small
communities.  While almost any form of collective decision making will be accompanied by
significant strains and frictions, many neighborhood associations have succeeded in bringing
residents together with a new form of common identity among themselves.  Neighborhood
associations are a new and important form of “private democracy” at work in American life.
Based on this positive overall assessment, the collective private ownership of
residential property perhaps might well be extended to existing inner city, suburban and
other neighborhoods where the housing units are at present individually and separately
owned.   The opportunity to live under the governance structure of a neighborhood
association is now effectively limited to neighborhoods that were initially developed as a25
single project, and the properties were sold with the structure of the neighborhood
association already in place.  Where properties historically have been separately owned, it
would involve prohibitively large transactions costs to assemble an after-the-fact collective
agreement among all the individual owners.  Thus, if existing neighborhoods are to be able
in the future to achieve new private forms of collective governance, new legislation will be
needed to facilitate the process.  Such legislation, as proposed below, should establish
procedures to allow residents of an existing neighborhood to vote to form a new
neighborhood association of their own.
A large literature describes the failings of municipal zoning in denying access to
land for moderate income housing in suburban developing areas, promoting haphazard and
“leapfrog” patterns of land development, stifling creative mixtures of land uses, frustrating
conversion of land to new higher-value forms of development, and other problems. Yet, the
core workings of municipal zoning thus far have been resistant to almost all reform efforts.
It may be that most past zoning reformers have been working under the wrong premises and
have therefore proposed the wrong remedies.  They have generally accepted the basic goals
and existence of the zoning system, and then sought to improve zoning within this legal and
theoretical framework.
Instead, a more radical cure for zoning may be needed.  It may be time to move
beyond zoning altogether.  Although the transition would inevitably be difficult at times,
and would have to be accomplished gradually, in the long run municipal zoning in the
United States perhaps is best abolished.  The existing functions of zoning perhaps instead
should be served through private neighborhood associations. The longstanding de facto
“privatization of zoning” in its municipal forms could in this manner be explicitly26
recognized and formalized.  Existing “private” zoning of many years duration would be
replaced by the explicitly private legal instrument of the neighborhood association.
A Proposal: A Six-Step Process
In order to make the advantages of neighborhood associations also available to
existing neighborhoods, I propose that a new law be enacted in each state to provide a well
defined procedure for the establishment of a new neighborhood association.
29  For this
purpose, I propose the following six-step process, recognizing that many variations are
possible.
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1. A group of individual property owners in an existing neighborhood could petition
the state to form a neighborhood association.  The petition should describe the boundaries of
the proposed private neighborhood and the instruments of collective governance intended
for it.  The petition should state the services expected to be performed by the neighborhood
association and an estimate of the monthly assessment required.  The petitioning owners
should possess cumulatively more than 60 percent of the total value of neighborhood
property.
2.  The state would then have to certify that the proposed neighborhood met certain
standards of reasonableness, including having a contiguous area; boundaries of a regular
shape; an appropriate relationship to major streets, streams, valleys and other geographic
features; and other considerations.  The state would also certify that the proposed private
governance instruments of the neighborhood association met state standards.
3. If the application met state requirements, a neighborhood committee would be
authorized to negotiate a service transfer agreement with the municipal government in
which the neighborhood was located.  The agreement would specify the future possible27
transfer of ownership of muncipal streets, parks, swimming pools, tennis courts, and other
existing public lands and facilities located within the proposed private neighborhood
(possibly including some compensation to the city).  It would specify the future assumption
of garbage collection, snow removal, policing, fire protection, to the degree that the private
neighborhood would assume responsibility for such services.  The transfer agreement would
also specify future tax arrangements, including any property or other tax credits that the
members of the new neighborhood association might receive in compensation for assuming
existing municipal burdens.  Other matters of potential importance to the municipality and
the neighborhood would also be addressed.  The state government would serve as an
overseer and mediator in this negotiation process, and would have ultimate authority to
resolve disputes.
4. Once state certification of the neighborhood proposal, and a municipal transfer
agreement, had been achieved, a neighborhood election would be called for a future date.
The election would occur at least one year after the submission of a complete description of
the neighborhood proposal, including the founding documents for the neighborhood
association, the municipal transfer agreement, estimates of assessment burdens, a
comprehensive appraisal of the values of individual neighborhood properties, and other
relevant information.  During the one year waiting period, the state would supervise a
process to inform property owners and residents of the neighborhood of the details of the
proposal and to facilitate public discussion and debate.
5. In the actual election, approval of the creation of a new neighborhood association
would require both of the following: (1) an affirmative vote of property owners
cumulatively representing 90 percent or more of the total value of the proposed28
neighborhood; and (2) an affirmative vote by 75 percent or more of the individual unit
owners in the neighborhood.  If these conditions were met, all property owners in the
neighborhood would be required to join the neighborhood association and would be subject
to the full terms and conditions laid out in the neighborhood association founding
documents (the "declaration").
6. Following the establishment of a neighborhood association, the municipal
government would transfer the legal responsibility for regulating land use in the
neighborhood to the members of the neighborhood association, acting through their
instruments of collective decision making.  Zoning authority within the boundaries of the
neighborhood association would thus be eliminated.
Conclusion
The long run trend in the ownership of private property in the United States is away
from individual and towards collective forms of ownership.  A first large step in this
direction was the spread of the corporate form of business ownership in the second half of
the nineteenth century.  A new ease of transportation, economies of scale in mass
production, improved management techniques of business coordination, the rise of
nationwide markets, and other economic developments led American business to operate at
a whole new scale, and the corporate form of ownership proved to have large financial and
other advantages.  Although there were few business corporations before the Civil War, by
1900 almost two-thirds of U.S. manufacturing output was produced by firms operating
under corporate ownership, a figure that would reach 95 percent in the 1960s.
During the last 40 years of the twentieth century, the ownership of residential
property followed along a similar path.  Higher densities of development, the desire for29
more precise control over neighborhood character, lower-cost private provision of
neighborhood services, greater interest in common recreational and other community
facilities, and other economic and social forces made collective private ownership of
housing the choice of growing numbers of Americans.
In the past 30 years the spread of neighborhood associations has established a
widespread system of private regulation of land use and private provision of common
services for much of the new housing being built in the United States today.  Private
governments are increasingly replacing public governments at the local level.  If current
trends continue for long, the majority of all Americans at some point in the twenty-first
century could well be living in a regime of collective private ownership of residential
property.  Although the word "revolution" is overworked, the beginnings of a true social
revolution are apparent today in these developments.  The social significant of the new
collective ownership of residential property for the twenty-first century will likely be
comparable to the social impact that the rise of the corporate form of collective ownership of
business property had for the twentieth century.30
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